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ABSTRACT

There ore some philosphers, such as John Mackie, who believe that the
existence of God is logicallg inconrtpatible w i t h the existence of nrtoral
e v i l A l v i n Plantinga, in a series of books and a r t i c l e s , a t t e m p t s to
provide a Libertarian response to Mackie's arguments. Our paper i s an
examination of t h i s response, and culminates in the c l a i m that i f the
L i b e r t a r i a n notion of "inclining, w i t h o u t necessitating" i s coherent,
then i t i s l o g i c a l l g possible both that God e x i s t and t h a t there be moral
evil. In outline, our argument i s as f o l l o w s . If the L i b e r t a r i a n notion of
"inclining, w i t h o u t necessitating" i s coherent, then i t i s logicallg
possible both that (F1) f r e e w i l l and causal determination are
incompatible, and that (F2) statements of the f o r m " i f p were to obtain,
then X would freelg do A" be true. But i f i t is l o g i c a l l g possible that
both ( F l ) and (F2) are true, then i t f o l l o w s t h a t Mackie's argument i s
unsound, and Plantinga's response correct. In dealing w i t h various
objections t o our argument, we show that theg c r u c i a l l g depend on the
(unargued and question-begging) assumption that the L i b e r t a r i a n notion
of "inclining, w i t h o u t necessitating" i s /7oi coherent.

God and Freedom
J. Mintoff

There are several versions of the view that there Is no God. In
this paper v/e yv'III examine. In part, the strongest claim to this effect the claim that logical Inconsistency Is to be found In thelstic belief.
The most significant expression this has received In recent times
Issues from hackle:
1 think, however, that a more telling criticism can be made by
way of the traditional problem of evil. Here It can be shown, not
that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are
positively Irrational, that the several parts of the essential
theological doctrine are Inconsistent with one another
(Mack1e[55], p200)
Amongst Mackle's contemporaries, Aiken and McCloskey are others Y/ho
share this outlook^
Some narrowing of focus, however, will be required, as the scope
of the "traditional problem of evil" Is immense. There are a number of
reasons for this. Firstly, there are differences In the way that the
existence of evil Is taken to be a problem for the thelst. For hackle,
the problem consists In evil's being logically Incompatible v^'lth the
existence of God; for some thelsts, such as Baslnger (In Bas1nger[78]),
It consists In evil's providing strong evidence against God's existence;
Y/hereas, at a more personal level, the problem may consist In the
difficulty of maintaining faith In the face of personal tragedy. We y^IH
be concerned with hackle's understanding of the problem: How Is It
JogicâUy possible that God exist and that there be evil ?
Furthermore, there are differences In what types of evil present
the most difficulty for the thelst. A broad distinction Is often made
between moral and physical evil, the former being (roughly) that evil
which results from free human action and the latter the remaining evil.
We Y'/111 concentrate on the problem of rnordJ evil.
We Y/111 adopt a Libertarian understanding of free human action,
for our discussions vyill centre on Plantlnga's version of the so-called
"FreeYv'Ill Defense", which has at Its heart a vlevv of free human action
3 0009 02881 8735

that includes the follovying Libertarian components. First, the
assumption that free v/IH and causal determination are incompatible:
(Fl)

for all persons j< and actions A, if x freely does A then x's doing
A Y'/as not causally determined.

It also includes the view that (vv'lth appropriate, minimal, restrictions)
(F2)

for all persons x, actions A and propositions p. It Is logically
possible that statements of the form "if p were to obtain, then %
would freely do A" (which we shall call agent subjunctives) be
true^.

This second assumption maintains the possibility of agent subjunctives.
Thus we will concentrate on the question: HOYV' IS It logically possible
that God exist and that there be evil resulting frcfm free hurnorf sets
^Jnderstood in terms of (Fl) and (F2)] ?
Another reason for the size of the literature In this area Is the
great differences in what the notion of "God" Is taken to involve.
Plantinga claims that at the heart of the major religions - Christianity,
Judaism and Islam, for example - is belief In God, which is, in part, the
belief that there is "a personal being who, let's say, has existed from
eternity. Is almighty, perfectly wise, perfectly just, has created the
world, and loves his creatures" (Plant1nga[74a],pp1-2). Whether such a
viev'/ is at the heart of the major religions Is a dispute which v/e will
sidestep, by stipulatively Introducing our own notion of a divine being.
We assume that
(Gl)

there is a unique person (conscious and existing "in time") who is
all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good. And this being we call
God.

An Important intention of this assumption is that the term "person" be
taken literally. A person is, amongst other things, an entity with the
capacity for consciousness. More evocatively (and borrowing from
Thomas Nagel), a person has a subjective point of view - there Is
something that It Is like to be that person. A second Important
Intention Is that such a person be located "In time"^.
The understanding of the remaining key terms in this definition
are fairly standard and, pre-reflectively, quite appealing. We say that

(G2)
(63)
(G4)

8 being x is all-ooyyerfu] (or omnlDotent) If and only If x can
bring about any logically possible state of affairs,
X Is all-knov/ing (or omniscient) If and only If x knows all true
propositions, and
X Is all-good (or ornnlbenevolent) if and only If x does only Vv'hat
Is permitted, and everything that x (morally) ought.

The first two will require modification, but are useful as a starting
point for our focus on the question: How Is It logically possible that God
understood In terms of (G1) to (G4)] exist and that there be evil
resulting from free human acts [understood In terms of (F1) and (F2)] ?

In section I v^^e will examine hackle's argument to the claim that
this Is not logically possible. Plantlnga's reply Is detailed In section II,
where this argument of hackle's Is shown to be unsound, and then a
proof provided for the possibility of God's existing and there being
moral evil. This will complete the exposition of the Freewill Defense.
In the subsequent sections of the paper the focus shifts from
matters theological to those more metaphysical. We will see the
Importance that (F1) and (F2) play in the validity of the arguments in
section II. This Vv'in be the catalyst for our shift of focus to the
question: How Is it logically possible that (F1) and (F2) be true
together?
The nub of this issue lies in the analysis of agent subjunctives.
In section III v/e V'/ill provide a number of conditions that any analysis
of agent subjunctives must satisfy if It is to be sufficient to
Plantlnga's task, and suggest that the "incline, without necessitating"
notion common amongst Libertarians satisfies these conditions. Of
course, not everyone agrees that (F1) and (F2)
jointly possible, and
In the last two sections, we will show that significant criticisms of
Plantlnga's position reduce to the claim that (Fl) and (F2) are jointly
Incompatible with the observation that
(S)

subjunctive statements can be true only if there are other
factors which, m i h the antecedent's being true, causally
determine the consequent's being true.

According to (S), the only feasible analysis of agent subjunctives Is one

in which x's freely doing A is ceusally determined. It is no surprise that
Libertarians would deny (S), and do so by providing their "incline,
without necessitating" notion as an alternative analysis. In section IV,
we will examine the arguments of Hobart, vr'ho accepts (F2) and (S) and
so denies (F1) - freev/ill involves determination and is inconceivable
without it. Then in section V, we will look at the arguments of Adams,
Yi^ho accepts (F1) and (S) and so denies (F2) - there cannot be any truth
or falsity in vv'hat any person would do if some state of affairs were to
obtain. To conclude in section VI, we Vv'ill claim that if there is a
coherent notion of "inclining, without necessitating" then Plantinga's
argument is vindicated - it is logically possible that God exist and that
there be evil resulting from free human acts.

So, how is it logically possible that God exist and that there be
evil resulting from free human acts? One ansvY'er is that it is not
possible. In this section we will present Plantinga's discussion of the
following argument of hackle's for this view:
If God has made men such that in their free choices they
sometimes prefer what Is good and sometimes Vv'hat is evil, why
could he not have made men such that they always freely choose
the good? If there Is no logical impossibility In a man's freely
choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot
be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on
every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between
making Innocent automata and making beings vyho, in acting
freely, would sometimes go wrong; there Vv'as open to him the
obviously better possibility of making beings who would act
freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself
of this possibility Is Inconsistent v-nth his being both
omnipotent and wholly good. (Î1ack1e[55l,p209)

This argument Is Interpreted In a number of different vyays In
Plant1nga[65]. The first proceeds as follovys:
(1)
(2)

God Is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, and
If God Is omnipotent, then God can bring about any logically
possible state of affairs.

Thus
(3)
God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs.
However,
(4)
that all free persons do what is right on every occasion Is a
logically possible state of affairs,
and therefore
(5)
God can create persons such that they always do what Is right.
But
(6)
If God can create free persons such that they always do what Is
right, and He Is all-good and omniscient, then any free persons
created by Him alv-zays do what Is right.
Thus
(7)
Any free person created by God alvt'ays does what Is right.
As (2) is a definition, and (4) and (6) are necessarily true, then (1)
entails (7). But, as well as belief In an omniscient, omnipotent and
all-good God, the essential theological doctrine Includes belief In the
sinfulness of (free) human beings. It Is therefore Inconsistent.
The problem with this Is that (2), an Instance of (G2), is false.
That there are beings not created by God Is a logically possible state of
affairs, but these are not beings that God can create, notwithstanding
His omnipotence, as the statement "God can bring about a state of
affairs not brought about by God" Is Inconsistent^. The argument Is thus
unsound.

The attempt to deol with this problem leads to Plontlngo's
second Interpretation of Hackle's argument. It begins by adopting a
y/eaker notion of omnlpotence:
(G2')

X Is omnipotent If and only If x can bring about any state of
affairs p such that "x brings It about that p" Is consistent^.

The appropriate section of the argument is then modified to read:
(1)
(2')

Thus
(3')

God Is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, and
If God I s omnipotent, then God can bring about any logically
possible state of affairs p such that "God brings It about that p"
Is consistent.
God can bring about any logically possible state of affairs p such

thot "God brings it obout thai p" is consistent.
Hov/ever
{4')
"God creates free persons such that they alv/ays do vv'hat is
right" is consistent.
And therefore
(5)
God can create persons such that they alvyays do what is right.
And so on.
Plontingo thinks that there are problems with this version of the
argument also. (4') is ambiguous. It may mean
(4'a)

"God brings it about that (there are free persons and they alvyays
do Yv'hat is right)" is consistent

or it may mean
(4'b)

"God brings it about that (there are free persons) and they
always do what is nght" is consistent.

But, given (F1), it follows that (4'a) is false. If the argument is to be
sound, (4') must then be interpreted as (4'b). However, even if we do
this, (5) does not seem to follow from (3') and (4'b), for what does
immediately follow from this pair is only that God can bring it about
that (there are free persons), which does not imply that God can create
free persons such that they always do what is right. The argument again
seems to be unsuccessful.
This latest of Plontinga's objections to Mackie's argument
includes the assertion that (Fl) implies the falsity of (4'a). This
implication does not hold, and only appears to do so because of an
ambiguity in the expression "brings It about that".
This disambiguation Is one that first explicitly appears in
Plantlnga's own (later) writings (Plantinga[74a,bl) and can be motivated
as follows. It seems as though there are two types of situation in which
God brings It about that Anna, say, has cornflakes for breakfast as soon
as she gets up. He may causally determine that she do so, by setting off
the alarm and then subtly controlling her limbs, so that vyhlle having
cornflakes for breakfast Is something that Anna does. It Is not
something she does freely, for she had had no intention of so doing.
Alternatively, If God knevy that v/ere He to set off the alarm, Anna
Y'/ould (freely) have cornflakes for breakfast anyway, He could again

bring It about, that she did so, just by setting off the alarm. Anna would
have had the cornflakes, God would have (in a weaker sense) brought
this about, and no restriction of Anna's freedom v/ould have been
Involved. The ambiguity In (4'a) can now be brought out In the following
definitions. 'We say that
(8)

(9)

an agent x can (strongly) bring about (or, strongly actuallse) a
state of affairs p If and only If x can causally determine that p
obtain, and
an agent x can vv^eakly bring about (or, weakly actuallse) a state
of affairs p if and only if x can strongly actuallse some state of
affairs q such that if x v/ere to strongly actuallse q, then p
would obtain.

The exercising of these abilities is defined similarly. (4'a) is thus
ambiguous between
(4'a1) It is logically possible that God strongly brings it about that
(there are free persons and that they always do what is right)
and
(4'a2) It is logically possible that God wedkJy
it about that
(there are free persons and that they always do what is right).
What is at issue is not whether God could have strongly brought about a
morally perfect v/orld (for it seems to follow from (Fl) that this is not
logically possible) but rather whether God could hove weokJy brought
this about. That is, whether there was something that He could have
done that, were He to do it, would have resulted in a morally perfect
v/orld.
It seems unproblematic that (Fl) should Imply the falsity of
(4'a1). In.order to strongly bring it about that there are free persons and
that they alVi'ays do what is right, it vyould have been necessary for God
to first create some free beings and then strongly bring it about that
they do what is right on all occasions. But the only way that God could
have done this latter is if, on every occasion when one of these free
beings was facing a moral decision. He strongly brought it about that
they freely refrained from wrongdoing. But this is just what (Fl) denies
is possible, and so (4'a1) Is false^.

Also unproblematic is that (F1) should not imply the falsity of
(4'32). Suppose that for each person K and each morally right act B that
X might do, there is some enticing state of affairs E^,^ such that if God
were to (strongly) bring it about that E^g obtain, then K would freely do
B. Suppose further that i t is 'within God's power to jointly bnng about
all the
for such persons and acts. That this is a possitJe
situation follows from (F2). But if it dciually obtains, then God Cdn
weakly bring i t about that (there are free persons and they always do
what is right), for God could (strongly) bring about all the
and if
He were to do this, then all the free persons would alvyays do what is
right. In other words, if everyone has a price, then God can weakly bring
i t about that they freely do any act at all.

Thus when the ambiguous statement, (4'a), is interpreted in
temis of strong actualisation, Mackie's argument fails because it
follows from (FÎ) that God cannot strongly actualise a morally perfect
world, for this act of God's would involve restrictions on the free acts
of humans. Interpreting Mackie, then, in terms of weak actualisation
leads to a third version of his argument, as follows:
(1)
(2")

God is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good, and
If God is omnipotent, and "God Vv'eakly actualises p" is
consistent, then God can weakly actualise p.

Thus
(3")

God can weakly actualise any state of affairs p such that "God
weakly actualises p" is consistent.
Nov-/, as was shown in the previous paragraph,
(4")
it is logically possible that God weakly bring it about that
(there are free persons and they always do what is right),
and so
(5")
God ¿rva^Yv'eakly bring i t about that (there are free persons and
they always do what is right)
But,
(6")
If God can weakly bring this about, and He is all-good and
omniscient, then there are free persons and they alV'/ays do what
is right.
It follows that
(7)

Any free person created by God always does Vv'hat is right.

Hence i t is not logically possible that God exist and that there be evil

resUiUng from free action.
There are various lines of attack that one may take v^ith this
argument. Plantlnga opts for a denial of (2"), Adams for the denial of
(4"), and certain "soul-rnaklng" theodlclsts for the denial of (6"). !n the
next section, v-ze examine the path that Plantlnga has taken"^.

11
Hackle's argument Is unsound because one of Its premises, (1.2"),
Is false - God's being ornlnpotent does not entail His being able to
weakly actuallse any state of affairs p for which "God weakly
actuallses p" Is consistent. This will occupy us In the first part of this
section. But not only is hackle's argument unsound. It Is actually
possible to provide an argument to the opposite conclusion - It can be
shoYi'n that It is logically possible that God exist and that there be evil
resulting from free human action. This will occupy us In the second
part. Both of these claims depend on (F1) and (F2) being true together.

However, before we can show why hackle's argument Is unsound,
a fey/ (technical) preliminaries must be got out of the way:
(a) The analyses of logical necessity and possibility are standard. A
proposition p Is logically possible (or op) If and only If there Is some
possible world In which It Is true, and Is necessary (or Dp) If and only
If It Is true In all possible worlds. Possible worlds themselves are to
be understood as maximal consistent states of affairs. A state of
affairs S includes another T If It Is not possible that S obtain andT not,
and precludes T if It Is not possible that S end T obtain together.
(b) In any possible world W, there may be many states of affairs
included In W that God strongly actuallses. We can, so to speak, collect
these together to form T^, the Jdrgest state of affairs that God
strongly actuallses In Vf God's strongly actual!sing T.^^ Is included in W,
and T^^ Includes every state of affairs God strongly actuallses In V-/. If
God does not exist In V^, then T,^^ Is the contradictory (empty) state of
affairs.
(c) Follov'/ing Plantlnga, v/e abbreviate "God strongly actuallses state of

affairs p" by "Gp". Thus "GT^" represents "God strongly actualises T,^
(d) The subjunctive "if p were true, then q would be true" plays a key
role in the discussion. V^e distinguish the following:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

Our intuitive understanding of this statement,
Lewis's understanding, which holds that such a statement is true
if and only if either p is impossible or some world W in which p
and q hold is more similar (to the actual world) than any world
in which p and not-q hold®. And,
Another sense, which is that understendiifg of the subjimctive
that Piantiifga's argument actually requires in order to succeed
This will be denoted by "p •-> q", Vv'hich we have appropriated
from Lewis.

These are distinguished so as to leave open not only the question of
whether Levyis' analysis is adequate to our intuitons regarding
subjunctives, but also to leave open the question of whether it is Lewis'
analysis (or perhaps some other) which is the one appropriate to
Plantinga's argument. Later in the paper we will see that the three
come apart, although Plantinga seems to assume that Lewis' analysis is
adequate and argues accordingly.
(e) On the assumption, however, that either our intuitive understanding
or Lewis's understanding of the subjunctive locution /.^adequate, it
follows that
(I)

if W is a possible world and p a logically possible state of
affairs such that p •-> vy, then W includes p.

Intuitively, this is obvious. On Lewis's analysis, if p •-> W and p is
logically possible it follows that there is a world W* in v/hich p and W
obtain.and which is more similar (to the actual world) than any world in
v/hich p and not-W obtain. But as W is included in
it is the same
world as W*, and so p is included in W, as it is included in Vv'*.
(f) The subjunctive "if p were true, then q might be true" also occurs in
the argument, and similar comments to those in (d) apply. Note that the
negation of "If p were true, then q would be true" is "if p were true,
then q might be false". Thus the "might" subjunctive that Plantinga
actually requires, to be denoted by "p o-> q", is equivalent to "not-(p

•-> not-q)".
(g) Again assuming that either our intuitive understanding or LeV'/ls's
understanding of the subjunctive locution is adequate to Plantinga's
task, we can shovv' that
(2)

if a possible world W precludes state of affairs p and

0->

P, then God cannot vt'eakly actualise W.
For suppose God cdn Vv'eakly actualise Vf In other words, suppose there
is some state of affairs C that God can strongly actualise and such that
GC •-> W. Now as God car/ strongly actualise C, then GC Is a logically
possible state of affairs and so W Includes GC (by (1)X According to the
definition of T^ this implies that T^ includes C and so
includes GC.
That is, Ddf GT^, then GC). But from this and GC •-> W it follows by
transitivity that GT.^ •-> W^. As W is o possible world which precludes
p. It is one that inciudes not-p, and so GT^ •-> not-p, or alternatively
not-(GT.^ o-> p). Hence if W precludes p and GT^ 0-> p then God cannot
weakly actualise W. That is to say. If everything that God does in V</
still might not result in Vfs being actual, then God cannot even weakly
actualise W, as there is nothing that God can do that would lead to Vfs
being actual.
This completes our preliminary comments.
To now return to the point, we show that Mackie's argument Is
unsound because It relies on the false premise:
(L2") If God Is omnipotent, and "God weakly actualises
consistent, then God can vyeakly actualise p.

p" is

Consider Curly Smith, the mayor of Boston (and a regular In Plantinga's
arguments), who is offered a bribe of $20,000 to drop his opposition to
a proposed freevv^ay route through the Old North Church along with some
other antiquated and structually unsound buildings. Plantlnga claims
that
(3)

there are possible y/orlds
and Vv'* such that (a) God exists in
both W and V^*, T^ Is the same as T^^^, W Includes Curley's freely
accepting the bribe, and V/* includes Curley's freely rejecting

the bribe, and (b) It is logically possible that God weakly
actuallse W; and similarly for V/*.
He says:
let Vi/ be a world V'/here God exists, v^here Curley Is free v/lth
respect to the action of taking a $20,000 bribe, and Vv'here he
accepts it; and as before, let T [our T,^] be the largest state of
affairs God strongly actualtses In Vf God's actuallsing T (GT)
Includes neither Curley's accepting the bribe (A) nor his
rejecting it (not-A) [for these are free actions and so cannot be
logically included in T, which is v-zhat God sirorfgjy actualises In
W. This is a consequence of (Fl)]; so there is a world W* where
God strongly actualises T and in which Curley rejects the bribe.
(Pl8nt1nga[74bl,ppl82-183)
Because Plantlnga does not further argue, but just assumes, that God's
weakly actuallsing W and W* Is logically possible, we will f i l l In the
gap in his argument as follows. Consider W* first. Suppose that: evenj
state of affairs in W* of the fonri "x freely does B" Is such that GT^^^
•-> X freely does B. Then God can weakly bring these states of affairs
about (by strongly actualislng T^^, something He can strongly do). And
so as God can, in any case, sirongly actuallse any states of affairs In
W*
this form (for they do not involve free human acts), then God
can weakly actuallse dJl of W*. That this supposition is logically
possible is 0 consequence of (F2). Hence it is also logically possible
that God weakly actualise W*, and similar comments apply for W. Thus
(3) is true.
Consider then these two possible vyorlds, W and W*. Letting A be
Curley's accepting the bribe, then either GT^ •-> A or not-(GT^ •-> A),
and so as T^ is T^^ then either GT^^ •-> A or GT^ 0-'> not-A. But as W*
precludes A (it includes not-A) It follows from (2) that
(4)

gT.,^^ o-> a implies that God cannot weakly actuallse W*.

As GT^* •-> A implies that GT^» o-> A, then
(5)

GT^^* •-> A implies that God cannot weakly actuallse V/*,

As Vy precludes nol-A (it includes A) then it follov/s from (2) that
(6)

GT.^^ 0-> not-A Implies that God cannot weakly actuallse Vf

Either way
(7)

there are possible worlds that God cannot weakly actualise, even
though it is logicdUy possible that He actualise thern.

But as (7) is entailed by necessary truths, it is itself a necessary tnjth.
God's being omnipotent is logically possible. Thus God's being
omnipotent does rfoi entail that He can weakly actualise every state of
affairs p for which "God weakly actualises p" is logically possible,
Mackie's argument is unsound.

But not only is his argument unsound, we are actually able to
provide an argument to the opposite conclusion - it is logically posible
that God exist and that there be evil resulting from free human acts.
As our good friend Curley is a free human agent, it is presumably
logically possible (though perhaps unlikely) that he always freely do
vyhat is right. There are possible worlds, let us call them Curley-ideal
v^orlds, in which he is free with respect to some morally significant
action, and in which he only does what is right. Suppose that W is one of
these, and suppose also that there is some morally wrong action A such
that if God were to strongly actualise T^, then Curley would freely do
A. (F2) assures us that such a supposition is coherent. Then it follows
from (2) above that God cannot weakly actualise vy, because W, being a
Y/orld in which Curley does no wrong, precludes Curley's doing the
morally v/rong action A. Suppose, even further, that oil Curley-ideal
worlds are like this. Then there is no Curley-ideal v/orld that God can
weakly actualise. In this case Curley suffers from a rather unfortunate
malady: transY/orld depravity, hore generally,
(8)

a person x suffers from transVv^orld depravity if and only if for
every x-ideal v/orld V/ there is some morally vyrong action A
such that GT^^ • - > x freely does A.

As we have seen, from this it follows that if x is transworld depraved,
then God cannot v^eakly actualise any x-ideal Vv'orld. It is presumably

loglcally possible on the basis of (F2) thot
(9)

6od exists. He create free persons, and that they all suffer from
transworld depravity.

But If everyone dfd suffer from this affliction, then (1 0 tells us that
there would be no morally perfect world that God could weakly
actualise. Hence, every actual free person would perform at least one
morally wrong act, and so
(10)

there wm¡(f be evil resulting from free human acts.

As (9), which Is logically possible, entails (10) then it Is logically
possible that God exist and that there be evil resulting from free human
action^^.

Ill
The above positive argument of Plantinga actually needs to be
tightened up In a number of places. For example, while It may be true
that It Is logically possible that all dciudJ persons be transworld
depraved, might not there be possible persons (however this term Is to
be understood) who do not suffer from this dreaded affllcatlon and who
God could have created Instead of those beings he did create, and so
produce a morally perfect world? The answer, of course. Is to suggest
that It Is logically possible that all possible persons be transworld
depraved, and to run the rest of the argument as previously. In any case,
VT'e w i n not go Into the details of this v/ay, or other ways, that the
argument might be strengthened.
Instead, v/e shift our focus from these theological Issues to
more metaphysical ones. We have seen In the above section the Vv'ays In
V'/h1ch Pliantlnga's arguments depend on the Libertarian view embodied
In (F1) and (F2). Vi'e now consider the question: Hovv' Is it logically
possible that (F1) and (F2) be true together?
The nub of this issue lies in our understanding of agency and the
onolysis of agent subjunctives. In this section we avoid questions
dealing directly vyith agency, and Instead provide a number of
conditions that any analysis of agent subjunctives will have to satisfy
if It is to be sufficient to Plantinga's task. To recollect, "p • - > q"

denotes ttidt understanding of the locution "If p were true, then q would
be true" which Plantinga's argument dctudJJy requires in order to
succeed. Vv^e Vv'i]] suggest that it is the Libertarian notion "p inclines,
yyithout necessitating that q" that satisfies these conditions.

Our first tY'/o conditions ore motivated by the consideration that
"p • - > q" is in part an attempt to provide a basis for the truth of
ordinary agent subjunctives which does not imply that q is causally
determined. Thus on the one hand it must be that
(CI)

p • - > q does not imply that q is causally determined.

For Plantinga wants to say that it is logically possible for God to
Yi'eakly (though not strongly) actualise Anna's freely having cornflakes,
and so logically possible that there be some state of affairs C such
that: God strongly actualises C • - > Anna freely has cornflakes. If "p • - >
q" implied that q was causally determined, then Anna's having
cornflakes Y-/ould have been causally determined, and so not free after
all. In fact, the notion that Plantinga requires may satisy the obviously
stronger condition that
(cr)

p • - > q implies that q is noi causally determined.

On the other hand, for "p • - > q" to be able to provide a basis for
ordinary agent subjunctives, we need the following connection between
these two notions:
(C2)

p 0 - > q implies that if p were true, then q would be true.

These two conditions, (CI) and (C2), give us the room to explain the
possibility of (FO and (F2). If "God sets off the alarm • - > Anna wakes
up and freely has cornflakes for breakfast" is true then it follows that
were God to do this, Anna would have cornflakes for breakfast, but that
her doing so would not be causally determined, for "God sets off the
alarm • - > Anna wakes up and freely has cornflakes for breakfast" does
not imply this. Thus if it is possible for statements of the form "p • - >
q" to be true, then it is possible that (Fl) and (F2) be true together.
Our next two conditions are motivated by the consideration that
"p • - > q" is to be in part a cdusdl notion. We can best see this by
examining the account that Plantinga attempts to give of this idea,

Which seems to include the adoption of either the Stelnaker or Lewis
possible Y'/orld analysis of subjunctives, Plantinga devotes a whole
section of Chapter 9 of Plantinga[74b] to a discussion of these viev^'s,
and enriploys them in one of his arguments (Plantinga[74b],p181).
Hov/ever, there is o problem with adopting Lewis' account of
subjunctive statements. (V-Ze will ignore Stalnakers' account altogether,
as it entails, rather implausibly, that either if p were true, then q
V'/ould be true or if p v/ere true, then not-q v/ould be true). For consider
the question: In what sense does God actualise the dciiwl
vv^orld?
Armed v/ith our definition above, (1.9), of God's being able to actualise a
possible state of affairs p we may provide the follov/ing analysis of
God's V'/eakly actualising, as opposed to God's being oble to weakly
actualise, a possible world W:
(1)

X weakly actualises VV if and only if there is some state of
affairs C that x strongly actualises such that : x strongly
actualises C • - > Ví^ obtains.

If Lewis's analysis Is the understanding of subjunctives that Plantinga
requires, then (1) unfortunately runs aground of the inference
(2)

p, q / therefore, p • - > q

which is valid In Lewis's semantics. Following Plantinga, we will call
the actual world "Kronos". Suppose that in Kronos Anna has cornflakes
for breakfast. Then chose any statement p Included in Kronos. As Kronos
Is actual, then p Is true and so by (2) it follows that: Anna has
cornflakes for breakfast • - > p. As this Is true for all states of affairs
p In Kronos, then: Anna has cornflakes for breakfast
Kronos obtains.
Anna Is v/eakly actualising the actual world! Hence Lewis' analysis is
not the understanding of subjunctives that Plantinga requires^^ The
above also indicates that another condition needed Is that
(C3)

p <5c. q does not imply p • - > q.

However, It still seems as though Plantlnga's analysis has
problems, even If we suppose that It Is our Intuitive understanding of
subjunctives which is the understanding that Plantinga requires. For
there seem to be quite plausible situations which, according to the
above definition of "weakly actualise", Imply that God, or anyone else,
can weakly actualise a past event which did not occur. For example,

suppose that God banished Adam and Eve on Tuesday of the second week
of creation. And suppose that He did this because they ate the apple on
the day before, Monday. That is, if God hadn't banished Adam and Eve on
Tuesday, then they v/ould not have eaten the apple on the proceeding
rionday. More to the point:
(3)

if It vvere the case that God did not banish Adam and Eve on
Tuesday, then it vyould be the case that Adam and Eve did not eat
the apple on Monday

or, still
(3')

God did not banish Adam and Eve on Tuesday • - > Adam and Eve
did not eat the apple on Monday.

So, as not banishing Adam and Eve on Tuesday Is something that God
could have strongly brought about, then God could have, on Tuesday,
weakly brought It about that Adam and Eve did not eat the apple on
Monday. This, however, i s false. Ordinary subjunctives, in general, do
not presuppose that the antecedent obtained no later than the
consequent. Yet another condition is required:
(C4)

If (p I s true at t^ • - > q Is true at 12), then t^ is not later than {2-

These two conditions, (C3) and {C4), Indicate that the notion the
argument needs I s In some sense a causal notion. First, it does not
follov/ from the fact that two states of affairs obtain that there Is a
causal connection between them. And second, causes occur no later than
their effects.
Our last condition is motivated by the consideration that
Plantlnga's argument as stated Is to remain valid, given that what he
understands by subjunctives Is neither what we ordinarily understand
by them, nor what Lewis understands by them. It ought to be that
(C5)

"p • - > q" behaves, for the most part, like what we usually
understand by the locution "if p v/ere true, then q vyould be true".

The notion that Plantlnga's argument requires should be sufficiently
similar to the locution "If p were true, then q would be true" so as to
ensure the validity of the argument presented In section II, and need
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differ only in sotlsfying conditions ( C I ) to (C4). Admittedly vogue, this
last condition is an application of the principle of charity.
!t may be that there are other conditions that any notion
sufficient to Plantinga's task must satisfy, but v/e tenatively suggest
that If there Is a notion satisfying ( C I ) to (C5), then Plantinga's
argument i s successful.

Indeed, it appears that there is such o notion. It
Libertarian notion of "inclining, without necessitating":
( C I ) If p Inclines, without necessitating,
not follOYv' that q is causally determined.
q I s /7r//causally determined, but this I s
might not necessitate that q, there may
that does.

is

the

that q then it obviously does
It may even be that it Implies
problematic, because vv'hlle p
be another state of affairs r

(C2) If p inclines without necessitating that q, if p thus infJuences
Y/1thout necessitating that q, then, given a strong enough construal of
this influence, it follows that If p were to obtain, then q would also.
The Intuitive Idea behind "a strong enough construal" of this Influence
i s as follows. Lewis has shown that the truth of "If p were true, then q
V'/ould be true" does not depend on p's being causally sufficient for q
(See Note 8). It depends Instead on how much more likely It Is that p and
q be true than that p and not-q be true. A "strong enough" construal of
p's Influence on q, then. Is one that makes It sufficiently more likely
that p and q be true than that p and not-q be true (so that If p were true,
then q would be true) without this Influence being so strong that It
makes p causally sufficient for q, and without Its Implying that there
might be some other factors which, with p, are causally sufficient for
q.
(C3) From the fact that two states of affairs obtain it does not follow
that one Influenced the other, and so does not follovv' that one inclined
without necessitating the other. The fabric of influence is not so
detailed as to connect any two states of affairs.
(C4) Influence cannot run backv/ard In time. If p and q obtained and p
Influenced v-zlthout necessitating that q, then p must have obtained at a
time no later than q.

(C5) The question of whether "Inclines, v/ithout necessitating" is
sufficiently like V'/hat Vv'e usually understand by subjunctives depends
on the explication that is given of "inclines, 'without necessitating". As
it is not sharply enough defined to allov^ an answer either v/ay on this
question, this last condition is better thought of as providing a
direction in v^hich the notion ought to be sharpened, if it is to do some
of the philosphical vyork allocated to it.
There are those, however, vyho doubt that the notion of "incline,
Y/ithout necessitating" makes any sense at all, and who would also
doubt that there was any notion that satisfied (CI) to (C5). It does
seem, nonetheless, that if "inclines, without necessitating" is coherent,
then it satisfies these conditions, thus vindicating Plantinga's
aroument.

IV
There ore significant objections to Plantinga's position which
reduce to the claim that (F1) (free action is not causally determined)
and (F2) (agent subjunctives are possible) are jointly incompatible with
the observation, (S), that subjunctive statements can be true only if
there are other factors which, with the antecedent's being true,
causally determine the consequent's being true. In this section we
consider responses to Plantinga which accept (S) and (F2), and so reject
(Fl).

Our storting point is Burch[79] who responds to Plantinga's
argument to the conclusion, (11.3a), that there are possible vyorlds 'W
and W* in v/hich God e>iists, T^ is identical to J^^, W includes Curley's
freely accepting the bribe, and W* includes his freely rejecting it.
Burch argues against this claim by showing that Plantinga's argument
for it is invalid. He firstly shows, correctly and more generally than
Plantinga, that
(D

if God can weakly actualise both W and W*, then T,^ = T^^^

and

only if Vv' = Vv'*^^
According to Plantinga there are distinct possible worlds VV and V/* for
which T^
Vr = J^^
W ' and so it follov/s that there is some possible world that

God cannot v/eakiy actuslise (either W or W*). As the Leibnizian wants
to deny this (God can yyeakly actualise aJ] possible worlds), it must be
denied that there could be two such possible worius, and denied bu
pointing out that
the argument begs the question by assunrnng a proposition that
the Leibnizian should rush to deny: namely, that the largest state
of affairs that God actualises in Vv* [our T,^^^] is T, namely the

very sdme state of affairs that Is the largest state of affairs
God actualises In W (ourl. 1 (Burchi79l,p29:italic£ added/
If we look at Plantinga's argument Vv'e see that It depends on the
inference from
not including Curley's rejecting the bribe to the
claim that there I s thus another possible v/orld V-/* which Includes God's

exdcily T,^^ (and so T,^ = T^^^) and Curley's rejecting
the bribe. However, all that siriciJy follows Is that there Is a possible
world 'W* which includes God's strongly actualislng T,^^ {tfui perhaps
strongly actual 1 sing

strongly ôciuôlfsing moré and Curley's rejecting the bribe. Plantinga's
argument i s thus invalid.
However this seems to be the wrong place to apply pressure to
the argument. For, it i s possible to provide another argument to the
conclusion that Plantinga requires, (11.3a), without making this doubtful
inference. For consider a possible state of affairs S where (1) God
e x i s t s and the only actions that He (strongly) performs are A^ through
\

(so that Tg i s the conjunctive state of affairs k^h

.. /&..

and (11)

Curly i s offered the bribe and he freely accepts It or freely rejects It.
Then S does r/oi Include Curley's freely accepting the bribe. For suppose
that it did. This i s to say that (1) and (11) together Imply that Curley
freely accepts the bribe. But as (11) does not imply this, then it must be
(i) that does. That i s , T 5 Includes Curley's freely accepting the bribe, or
In other words, v/hat God strongly does in S Includes Curley's freely
accepting it. But, according to (Fl), this Is not possible. Hence It Is
logically possible that: S and Curley does not freely accept the bribe.
But in S Curley either freely does or freely refrains from this act, and
so it i s logically possible that: S and Curley freely rejects the bribe.
Which i s to soy that there Is o possible world W * In which God exists,
T y * i s A^ & . . . Ay^, and which includes Curley's freely rejecting the
bribe. Similarly, there i s another possible world W in which God exists,
T

i s A^

...L \

(and so T ^ is T^^^^), and which Includes Curley's

freeiy accBpting the bribe. This argument lacks the Inference that
Burch finds troublesome, and depends crucially
Instead on
incompatibilism, (Fl). It is at this point that Plantinga's argument is
vulnerable, and at this point that he and the Leibnizian fundamentally
disagree. That they should also disagree about the problematic
inference is a consequence of this more fundamental dissagreement.

Thus to dispute (lL3a) one can argue against incompatibilism,
(Fl). Hobart presents two arguments against this view. He argues that,
pace Plantinga, x's freely doing action A implies that x's doing A is
causally determined. This yyould entail that Libertarianism denies the
possibility of free action. His first argument claims that as an act not
caused is one not proceeding from rne, it is not my eci-.
In proportion as en act of volition starts of itself without cause
it is exactly, so far as the freedom of the individual is
concerned, as if it had been throvv'n into his mind from vv'ithout "suggested" to him - by a freakish demon. It is exactly like It In
this respect, that in neither case does the volition ... come out
of him. (Berofsky[66],p70)
Hobart speaks of "acts of volition", but the same could said about acts
simpliciier
Cathy (freely) does k only if her doing A proceeds from
Cathy herself, and
(2)

this could only be so if her desire to do A and/or her character
causally contribute, in some way, to her doing A.

But if one event causally contributes to another, the second must be
causally determined as, in general,
(3)

an event E^ causally contributes to the occurence of an event E2
only If there are other events which, with E^, causally determine
£2-

'What other understanding of causation, of causal contribution, could
there be? (This Is Hobart's version of (S).) Thus Cathy (freely) does A
only if her doing A Is causally determined. The very possibility of
action requires that this be so.

It Is easy to see v/hat Plantlnga's reply ought to be: (2) and (3)
cannot be true together. He might argue as follov'/s: (2) i s true only on
the condition that "causally contributes" be understood as "influences,
Y'/ithout necessitating", for he has no desire to deny that desires and
character pdrtidUy influence human behaviour, but denies only that
they toidJJy do so. But, in this case, the argument i s either unsound or
invalid. If "causally contributes" is similarly understood in (3), then (3)
I s false, because contradictory. If not so understood, then it no longer
folloYVS from (2) and (3) that Cathy's doing A is causally determined.
The second argument that Hobart offers states that as an act not
caused by rne i s one from which I could not refrain, it i s not rny free
act:
The freedom of anyone surely always implies his possession of o
poY/er, . . . A person has a power if it a fact that when he sets
himself in the appropnate manner to produce a certain event
that event v/ill actually follow. . .. Thus povv'er depends upon, or
rather consists in, a law. The lavv' in question takes the familar
form that if something happens a certain something else vv'ill
happen. (Berofsky[66],p72)
Hobart seems in this passage to be presupposing that subjunctives of
the form "if p were true, then q would be true" imply that q is causally
determined. Vt'hy might he believe t h i s ? Perhaps he believes it implies
that p causally determines q. This is not a valid inference (See Note 8).
On the other hand, perhaps he believes the vv'eaker assumption, (S), that
such subjunctives need only be bdckedby, rather than identicdJ with, a
statement refering to events (including p) which are causally sufficient
for q. Thus, Cathy does A freely only if she has the power to refrain
from so doing. But, In general, if x has the power to do A then it must be
that If X Y/ere to desire (intend,...) to do B, then x would do A. But
(5)

such a subjunctive claim can only be true if there are other
events which, with Cathy's desiring (intending, . . .) to do A,
causally determine that she do A.

Thus Cathy can do A freely only if her performing this act is causally
determined.
A weak point In this argument is the assumption that "cans" are
constitutionally iffy. This Is an area of much dispute, which we gladly

Sidestep by pointing out that it is, in any case, (4) where the
Llberatarlan can apply pressure, by insisting that "infuence, vt'ithout
necessitation" can ground subjunctive judgennents (see condition (C2)),
and so that such judgments need not be grounded in statements which
imply that q is causally determined.
Hobart's arguments, then, are ineffective against a Libertarian
armed with a coherent notion that satisfies (CI) to (C5). His arguments
beg the question to the extent that they assume that there Is no such
notion.
V
Hobart accepts both, (S), the analysis of subjunctives in terms
of causal determination, and (F2), the possibility of agent subjunctives,
thus arguing that free action Is possible only If it Is causally
determined. In this section we consider Adam's response to Plantlnga,
in which the possibility of agent subjunctives is denied, because of the
acceptence of (S) and (Ft). We will examine three such arguments.

Adams says that he has Yested an important part of [his]
argument on the assumption that what a person's character and
dispositions do not causally determine, they do not render absolutely
certain" (Adams[77],pn6). For his argument to be at all successful It
seems that It must be construed in the following way. Either there are
grounds for believing
{!)

if p were to obtain, then x would freely do A

v/hich Imply that p necessitates x's freely doing A, or there are no such
grounds. Needless to say, if the grounds of this statement do imply
this, then x does in fact not freely do A, for free acts are not causally
determined - (F1). On the other hand. If there are no such grounds, then
there are no grounds at all for believing this statement. For If p does
not necessitate x's doing A then p does not causally determine it, and so
does not render it absolutely certain. But, in general,
(2)

"if P 'T'/ere true, then q yyould be true" implies that p. If it occurs,
renders q absolutely certain.

Hence if p does not necessitate x's doing A then "if p vv'ere true, then x

would freely do A" is folse. And so either way there ccrn be no grounds
for believing statements of this form.
However, the crux of this argument, (2), is false. In making
subjunctive statements v/e do rfoi require that the antecedent make the
conclusion absolutely ceridin{\x\ the very strong sense that it seems
Adams requires). My releasing a pen from my outstretched hand, and
expecting that it will fall on the ground, is a case in point. If I v/ere to
release said pen, then it wouJd fall on the ground, even though my
releasing it does not make it absolutely certain that it will do so, for it
is not absolutely certain that there will not be a sudden upward gust of
wind that will blovy the pen back into my hand. (2) demands a connection
betyyeen p and q v/hich is much too strong. And it seems that (2) v/ould
be accepted only by someone who held the view that the pertinant
subjunctive connection between p and q could only obtain if p v/as
causally sufficient for q, or perhaps if a weaker statement such as (S)
were true. Another counter-example is provided by Adams himself. It
seems uncontroversial that were I to ask my butcher to sell me a pound
of ground beef, he would (freely) do so. But, because his freely doing so
Implies that his act was not causally determined, my asking him did not
render his complying absolutely certain. (We examine later hovi' Adams
attempts to deal with this.)
Not all of Adams's arguments, however, depend crucially on the
assumption that what a person's character and dispositions do not
causally determine, they do not render absolutely certain. A better
argument has as a starting point (F1), the view that free actions are not
causally determined. There are those who believe that if this is so then
it follows that x's freely doing A is uncaused; it is independent of, not
related to, anything that came before; A is something that x just did\
x's doing A was rdndom It follows that can be true no statement of the
form (1). For suppose that such a statement vv'ere true. Then p's being
the case would come (temporally) before x's freely doing A (see
condition (C4)), and as this later event is independdnt of dJI thoi would
come before, then
(3)

if p were true, then x might not freely do A (or then again, x
might).

As (3) Is inconsistent v/ith (1), it follows that no statement of the
form (1) could be true. Hence the construal of free acts as uncaused
events implies that agent counterfactuals are necessarily false, and so

useless for the purposes of Plantlnga's argument.
A first (periiaps desperate) response to this might be to claim
that while any particular free act Is uncaused (and so random), a
statement such as (1) might be true on the basis of x's character. That
Is, while accepting that x's doing A Is uncaused. It follows from
(4)

If It Is In x's character to do A when p obtains, then If p were
true, then x would freely do A

that (1) Is possible, and so the above argument must be Incorrect. This
only follows, of course, if It Is possible that it be in x's character to do
A when p obtain. But If all free acts are construed as uncaused, as
random, then there Is no Important sense In which a person can be said
to have a character, for such an entity could play no role at all in that
person's behaviour. Rather than establishing the possibility of agent
subjunctives, (4) points out Instead that there is no coherent notion of
character if free acts are underetood as all being uncaused.
There is another, similar, point to be mode against this
understanding - it leaves reasons no place at all In the picture of
agency. If x's doing A Is Independent of all that came before, then it is
independent of the reasons that x might have had for doing It. Perhaps
reasons play a smaller role than Is usually assumed, but it Is just false
that they (necessarily) play no role.
Thus reasons must make It into the picture. There seem to be a
number of ways of doing this, depending on how one thinks that the
having of reasons is causally related to actions, and how the having of
reasons is Itself causally related to that which proceeded it. On the one
hand it may be that
(5a)

the reasons x had for doing A (say, the "strongest" reasons)
causally determined x's doing A; and (In order to maintain
incompatibilism) that the having of the reason was Itself
uncaused.

Or, perhaps,
(5b)

the reasons x hod for doing A cousolly determined x's doing A;
and that the having of the reason v-zas itself causally influenced,
without being necessitated.

Alternctlively,
(5c)

the reasons x hod for doing A influenced, but did not necessitate,
x's doing A; and the having of the reasons Vv'as itself causally
determined.

Examining these in turn, Y-/e see that the first suffers from the
same problems as did our more simplistic view of free agency. For if x
had reasons R for doing A then it follows by reasoning similar to above
that
(6)

if p Y/ere true, then x might not have had reasons R for doing A.

(It is important to keep in mind here the distinction between, on the one
hand, there tieing a reason R for x to do A, and, on the other, x's hdving
a reason R for doing A. There might have s t i l l been a reason R for x to do
A, Y/ithout X being avv'are of it, without x having had the reason.) 6ut as
x's having reason R to do A causally determines x's doing A, then
(following Hume)
(7)

if X hod not had reasons R to do A, then x would not have freely
done A.

But from (6) and (7) it follows that (1) is false. This method of
allov'/ing reasons into the picture is inadequate.
The first also shares with the second the defect of implying that
free acts are causally determined, specifically by the reasons R that x
had for doing A. Thus (9a) and (9b) are unacceptable.
We seem, then, to be left with (5c) as an explanation of the role
of reasons in agency. This explanation v/ill be coherent if V'/e have a
coherent noti.on of "influence, without necessitation". Given as much,
this second argument of Adams's is not successful because by supposing
that non-causally determined events are ipso facto uncaused (that is,
random), it attributes to Libertarians a quite implausible view of free
action. Again, it seems that this supposition would only be accepted by
someone who had already decided that (S) offers the only plausible
understanding of agent subjunctives.
A more elaborate and Imposing argument is presented by Adams
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towards the eriu of his paper (Ad6rris[77],pl13-114). He claims,
correctly, that theists like Plantinga attempt to employ statements
such as
(8)

If God created Adam and Eve, there would be more moral good
than moral evil In the history of the world

to explain why God created Adam and Eve. They do this because of the
truth of (8) and because He Is all-good and so desires the best for his
creatures. It Is an Important part of their case that (8) be prior In the
order of explanation than God's creating Adam and Eve, as the former Is
Intended, In part, to explain the latter According to Levv'ls's analysis of
subjunctives, (8) could only be true If there was a world in which God
created Adam and Eve and there was more moral good than evil In Its
history v/hlch Is closer to the actual vyorld than any v/orld In which God
created Adam and Eve and there was not more moral good than evil In
Its history. But, Adams continues, v/hlch world Is closest to the actual
world depends. In part, on which world Is actual, and this depends In
turn on v/hether or not God created Adam and Eve. Thus God's created
Adam and Eve cannot come dfier\.\\9i truth of (8) In the order of
explanation.
However, the truth of (8), namely the truth of: there was a world
In Y'/h1ch God created Adam and Eve and . . . , depends not on the fact that
it Is this particular world (Kronos, remember) which Is actual, but
rather that the actual world, v/hlchever It Is, Is one In which (8) Is true.
There are many other worlds In which this may be so - following
Adams, let us call K * the set of worlds In which (8) Is true. The truth of
(8) depends on the actual world's being a member of K * but not on which
member of K* It Is (Including Kronos). The thelst needs to claim that
the actual v/orld Is a member of K * and that Its membership In K * does
not depend on which of the alternatives amongst which God Is choosing.
Adams attempts to make all this more perspicuous:
Let us say that one of God's alternatives Is represented In K * If
and only If there Is some world In K* In v^hlch he chooses that
alternative. [(9):] If any of the alternatives amongst which God
was choosing Is not represented In K*. then the actual v^orld's
membership In K * depends on His rejecting that alternative, and
therefore cannot be prior In the order of explanation to His
decision. But I think that [(10):] at least one of God's
alternative's Is Indeed unrepresented In K*. For one alternative

WQs to make no free creatures oi oil, ond j do not see how o
V'/orld in V'/hich there are no free creatures at all could be a
member of K* (Adams[77],p114 Underlining added).
Before critically examining this argument, we will simplify it by
employing the definitions that Adams has introduced. It turns out to be
not as Imposing as it appears. First, the actual world is an element of
K* If and only if (8) is true, as p is true sfrnplicfier if and only if it Is
true in the actual v^orld - "the actual world's membership in K*" is thus
equivalent to "(8)'s being true". Next, an alternative A Is represented In
K* If and only If there Is a possible v^orld VV In which God brings It
about that A, and which Is a member of K*. That is, if and only if it is
logically possible that God brings it about that A and that (8) be true.
Thus Adams's argument comes to the following:
(9')

But
(10')

If A is one of the alternatives among which God was choosing,
and It is not possible that God brings it about that A and (8) be
true, then (8)'s truth depends on the truth of "God does not bring
It about that A".
It Is not possible that God refrain from creating free beings
(one of the alternatives among which He was choosing) and that
(8) be true.

Hence
(11) (8)'s truth depends on the truth of "God does not refrain from
creating free beings".
For the argument to be valid, "depends" must here be understood in such
a way that
(12) If p and q are true, and p's truth depends on q's truth, then p is
not an explanation for q.
Therefore,
(13) (8)'s truth is not an explanation of God's not refraining from
creating free beings, and so not an explanation of God's creating
Adam and Eve.
It Is possible to deny (9')^^, but in any case the important point
at which the Libertarian may apply pressure Is at ( 1 0 ' ) . HOY-/ could this
be false? That Is, how Is It logically possible that God refrain from
creating free beings and that (8) still be true? Adams provides the
following argument for (10'):
But I think that [(10):] at least one of God's alternative's is

indeed unrepresented In K*. For one alternative was to make no
free creatures at all, and I do not see how a v^orld in 'which there
are no free creatures at all could be a member of K*. Since it is
free actions that are morally good and morally evil, no possible
Vv'orld, Y'/, will be a member of K * unless there is some feature of
'ii by virtue of v^hich a difference of free actions of free
creatures in some worlds u and v would be a reason for counting
u es more similar than v to w (in relevant respects). And any
such feature of v/ must surely involve the existence in w of free
creatures. If there are no free creatures at all in w, what would
make vy more like a world in which most free creaturely
decisions are good ones than like a world in vyhich most free
creaturely decisions are bad ones? (Adams[77],p114 Underlining
added).
The attempt to answer Adams' rhetorical question might begin
by noticing that there are in this world certain nôiurôl features which
entice moral behaviour and discourage immoral behaviour (and even if
there are not, the argument only requires that there could be). This is
not to say that these features are causally sufficient for such moral
behaviour, it is just that were such features present in a situation
Y/here a moral decision is being made, then the morally correct action
Y^ould be (freely) taken. Now as the existence of these natural features
of the world is indépendant of the existence of free being.s, then it is
presumably possible that these very features occur in a world with no
free beings. The world that Adams' asks for, w, is such world. It is
more similar (in the relevant, moral, respects) to a Y/orld, u, in Yvhich
most free creaturely decisions are good ones than to any world, v, in
which most are bad. Not because of the dciual amount of moral good
and bad Y/hich occurs in y/ as compared to that which occurs in u and v,
for by hypothesis there is no moral good or bad in w, lacking as it is in
moral agents. The difference, rather, between w, u, and v, is in the
amount of hypotheiicaJ moral good and evil that each would contain,
the amount of moral good and evil that would result Y^ere God to create
Adam and Eve. World w is more similar to u than v because yv', like u, is
such that were God to create Adam and Eve, there Y/ould be more moral
good than evil in the history of the world. While w contains no free
beings, counterfactual statements refering to the actions of agents,
were there to ùe dny, can be true. As Plantinga points out when
discussing the criteria for the similarity of Y/orlds:
One measure of similarity betv-zeen worlds involves the question

whether they shsre the some counterfQctuols. (p]ont1ng8[74b],
pi 78).
It is (8)'s being true in w and u, and not in v, that explains why w and u
are more similar to each other than w is to v. As can be seen, this reply
to Adams depends on the possibility of agent subjunctives - the very
possibility that Adams attempts to deny. In asking the rhetorical
question he does, Adams' begs the question against Plantinga.
Adams seems, in fact, to hold a rather unexpected view in these
matters. He seems to agree vfith Plantinga that free acts are causally
undetermined:
The Jesuits held, amonst other things, that many human actions
are free in the sense that their agents are not logically or
causally determined to do them. ("Free" will alv/ays be used in
this sense in the present essay) (Adams[77l,p109)
A s we have seen, he also believes that subjunctives entail that their
consequents are causally determined, and from this it follows that
there can be no true agent subjunctives. He is frank, hovi'ever, when he
admits being perplexed by the fact that there ¿T'^? appear to be true
subjunctives of this form:
There does not normally seem to be any uncertainty at all about
what a butcher, for example, would have done if I had asked him
to sell me a pound of ground beef, although we suppose that he
VY'ould have had free will in the matter. We would say he would
certainly have sold me the meat, if he had it to sell. What makes
us regard it as certain? Chiefly his character, habits, desires,
and intentions, and ths absense of countervailing dispositions.
(Adams[77],p115-116)
There seem, according to Adams, to be three general ways out. First,
one could say that true subjunctives putatively of the form "if p were
true, then x would freely do A" are more correctly understood as "if p
were true, then x vvould probdbJy freely do A". It is character, habits,
etc,, vyhlch make this latter subjunctive true (though not the former).
Second, one could say that such a statement is true because x's freely
doing A Vv'as causally determined. By Adams' own admission, this is
inconsistent. Third, one could claim, that x's doing A is not causally
determined by p, although the latter does render the former "absolutely

certain". Because Adams thinks that subjunctives require such absolute
certainty (a claim Vv'lth v-zhlch we disagreed above) and because such
certainty Is only to be got by causal determination, then nor Is this path
open to Adams. He seems left with the first suggestion.
Unfortunately for Adams, however, any success In his arguments
against Plantlnga Vv'ould mitagate against his ovv'n diagnosis of the
situation. If character and reasons provide no ground for agent
subjunctives, then neither do they for probabilistic agent subjunctives.
Either Adams accepts the "Incline, without necessitating" role of
character and reasons in action, or he doesn't. If he does, then (as we
have argued In section ill - condition (C2)) a basis for agent
subjunctives can be provided. If not, then It seems as though the only
account Adams has available Is that actions are uncaused, that Is,
random. (If this Is not so, then the onus Is on him to provide yet dnoiher
account of the relation between reasons and action.) But if this Is so,
then not only could there be no true agent subjunctives, but there could
be no true probabilistic agent subjunctives, either. For Adams says that
the claim that
(14)

If David stayed In Kellah, Saul would probdtfly beselge the city

Is to be understood as the claim that
(15)

Saul Yv'lll besiege the city

would tiB probable, given the facts that would (definitely, not just
probably) obtain If David stayed In Kellah. But If Soul's (freely)
besieging the city Is uncaused. If It Is thus unrelated to anything that
came before, then there Is nothing that v/ould make It protfdtda^hQre Is
nothing that would make n more likely than his not besieging the city.
Adams' diagnosis Is unsuccessful.
Adams's arguments are, like Hobart's, Ineffective against a
Libertarian armed with a coherent notion that satisfies (CI) to (C5). His
arguments beg the question to the extent that they assume that there Is
no such notion.

VI
There are many Interpretations of the claim that evil is a
problem for one v^ho believes in God. in the introduction we narrov'/ed
our focus in a number of v^ays. V/e adopted an understanding of the term
"God" that has changed as a consequence of our discussions (see Notes 5
and 7). It is ncw encapsulated in the statements:
(61)

there is a unique person (conscious and existing "in time") v-zho is
all-pov'/erful, all-knowing, and all-good. And this being v/e call
God.
(G2'b) A being x is all-powerful only if x can strongly actualise every
possible state of affairs p such that "x strongly actualises p" is
consistent;
(G3') X is all-knovying if and only if x knows all true propostions p
such that "X knov/s p" is consistent; and
(G4) X is all-good if and only if x does only what is permitted,
and everijthing that x (morally) ought.
'We also restricted ourselves to consideration of mordJ evil (that evil
v/hich results from free human action) and understood "free human
action" itself in Libertarian terms. Specifically, we assumed that
(F1)
(F2)

if X freely does A, then x's freely doing A is not causally
determined, and
it is logically possible (vv'ith appropriate, minimal, restrictions)
that statements of the form "if p were true, then x would freely
do A" to be true.

And finally, we only considered the logicoî problem of moral evil: How

is it logicdJJy possible tf-idt God exist ônd tiiot tiiere ùe evil resulting
from free /7i/mân ôcts?

V</e savy In section I that, according to îlackie, this is not
logically possible. His argument claimed that as God can do anything
that is possible, and as everyone's always doing v/hat is right is
possible, then God ought to have created a morally perfect world.
Plantinga's reply, in section 11, proceeded as follows: it is
possible (and, indeed, probable) that if God created free persons and
left them to their own devices, all would sometimes freely do v/rong.
Notvvlthstanding His povv'er, knov/ledge and goodness, there is nothing

that God wouiu be able to do about this, for what free persons do Is
solely up to them. God's existing (and being ail-pov/erful, all-knovv'ing,
and all-good) does not enidii that there Is no evil resulting from free
human acts, for whether or not there will be depends on the free human
agents. Thus it Is logically possible that God exist and that there be
evil resulting from free human acts.
As Plantlnga v/ould readily admit, this argument depends
crucially on the Libertarlanism embodied In (F1) and (F2). How dre (FÌ)
ár/d (F2') joir/tiy possiùJe, and what understanding of agent subjunctives
does Plantinga
require if his argun-ient is to ùe va/id? Jhes^ tv/o
questions briefly occupied us In section III, where the focus of the
paper moved from theological to metaphysical Issues. We saw that the
subjunctive that Plantinga requires, denoted by "p • - > q", is to satisfy a
number of conditions:
It Is to provide a basis for ordinary subjunctives which does not imply
that It is causally determined that the consequent obtain:
(CD
p • - > q does not imply that q is causally determined,
(C2)
p • - > q implies that if p were true, then q Vv'ould be true.
it is to be, In a certain minimal sense, a causal notion:
(C3)
p q does not imply p
q,
(C4)
If (p is true at t^ • - > q is true at \.2) then t^ is no later than Í2Finally, It Is to be understood in such a way as to make it most likely
that Plantinga's argument is valid:
(C5)
"p • - > q" behaves, for the most part, like what we usually
understand by the locution "if p v^'ere true, then q would be true".
ir there Yv'ere a notion which satisfied these conditions, then
Plantinga's argument vv'ould be vindicated. Indeed, It appeared that the
Libertarian "Inclines, without necessitating" is just what Is required, if
tt/ere is a (coherent) notion of meaning, vYithout necessitating",, ti^fen
it is iogicaiig possiùie tf/at God exist and that there he evil which
results from free human acts
V/e examined significant criticisms of Plantinga's position
v/hlch reduced to the claim that (F1) and (F2) are jointly Incompatible
with the observation that

(S)

subjunctive statements in general can be true only if there are
other factors which, v-zith the antecedent's being true, causally
determine the consequence's being true.

As we have seen in section IV, Hobart believes that both (F2) and (S) are
true, and as a result holds that free action actually requires
determination. On the other hand, Adams argued in section V that as
(F1) and (S) are true, then (F2) cannot be true. In addition, he atternped
to give an account (albeit unsuccessfully) of V'/hy (F2) appears to be
true. In both these sections the arguments obtain v^hatever purchase
they have by arguing from (S), which Is at least to deny the coherence
of the "inline, V'/lthout necessitating" notion. But to employ this premise
is to beg the question against Plantlnga.
Thus it seems that if iiiere is o (coiierent)notion of "inclining,
witiioui necessiioting", ti^fen it is logicellg possitde that God exist end
if/dt there be evil wiiicii results from free iiurnon dcts But is there
such a notion?

NOTES

1-

For the relevant passages, see i1cCloskey[60], p97 and A1ken[57l,
p79.

2.

Subjunctives will play a pivotal role In our discussions, so we
take the opportunity at this point to Introduce some ternrilnology.
In general, we understand such a statement to be of the form "If p were
true, then q v/ould be true". A probabilistic subjunctive Is one of the
form "If p Y/ere true, then It vyould probably be true that q". (We will
not encounter these until section V). An agent subjunctive, as we have
just seen. Is a subjunctive of the form "If p vyere true, then x would
freely do A".
3.

There ore those think that this Is already too anthropomorphic on
understanding of God's nature to be correct. For example, Kroon
comments that the type of occount thot Plontlngo offers
does not admit any 'In principle' difference between the case of
God and the case of humans. God, like his creatures, acts against
the background of the actual world. More of the actual Vv'orld Is
directly attributable to him than to us, of course, but
nonetheless the difference looks. In an Important sense,
quantitative only. This startllngly anthropomorphic conclusion Is
the price we pay for [such an account], (Kroon[81],p91)
But this seems Inadequate. Firstly, the notion of a seperate conscious
being seems to be requirecJ If sense Is to be made of the Idea of God's
relating at all to the world, via action and knov/ledge. If we say that
God spoke with Hoses, we mean, do we not?, that Moses v/as standing at
the top of the mountain communicating with another, separate,
conscious being. It Is just very difficult to see how one could
cornmurncoie with a being that was not conscious and that was not "In
time". Secondly, just how anthropomorphic is this understanding of
consciousness anyway, v/hen It includes not only bats, but also any
Martians that there might be? To say that there Is something It Is like
to be an Martian Is not to say that
know vv'hat It Is (or that Vv'e even
could knoYi'). To say that there Is something It Is like to be God Is not to
say that Y/e know Y/hat it Is, and this Is Y/hat might be Y/orryIng some.
The onus Is on philosophers such as Kroon to provide an explanation of

-

-

Y'/hy (Gl) is Incorrect, if It is. Prims fscie, it seems acceptable.
4.

But Bennett, in a reply to Plantinga, believes that this statement
is consistent, and only has the appearance of being inconsistent
because of the "logician's convention of expressing statements
tenselessly" (Bennett[73],p44). When interpreted as "God could have
brought about a state of affairs that wds not (in fact) brought about by
God" the temptation to think the original statement inconsistent, says
Bennett, disappears. This is true, but why should it be interpreted in
this way? If, on the contrary, it is interpreted as "God can now bring
about a (past) state of affairs that W6S not (in fact) brought about by
God" then it is again overwhelmingly tempting to say that the original
statement is inconsistent, for it is not logically possible (even for God)
to change the past.
But no matter which of these is the intended interpretation, it is
easy to shov/ that (G2), while a popular understanding of God's
omnipotence, is still false. Of the modes in which God may be
omnipotent, there are theistic doctrines which hold that God is
omnipotent riecessQilly (in all possible v^orlds), and others which hold
that He is so esseniidJly (in all possible worlds in which He exists). V^e
assume only that God is omnipotent ornniiernpordUy (at all times, in
the actual v/orld). It follows then, with (G2), that
(1)

at all times t, if p is a logically possible state of affairs, then
God can bring it about that p

end so, es whatever logical status a statement has it has at all times,
(2)

if p is a logically possible state of affairs, then at all times t,
God can, at t, bring it about that p.

But (2) Is false, for it is not logically possible to novy influence (and d
fortiori change) past events, even though it is logically possible that
they were different. We present the following counterexample to (2).
Suppose that, in spite of its being only just above freezing, it does not
snow on Tuesday. Presumably, it is logically possible that it did. Hence
it follows from (2) that God can, on Wednesday, bring it about that it
snoY'/ on Tuesday. But this is false as there is nothing that God can do on
V/ednesday (the day after) that would result in its snowing on Tuesday.
onversly, it is easy to see that God can, on Monday (the day

before), bring It about that It snow on Tuesday. For there I s something
that God can do on Monday, namely dropping the temperature even
further, that Vv'ould result In I t s snowing on Tuesday. We mention this
last point to forestall the f a t a l i s t i c argument that as statements such
as "It snowed on Tuesday" are. If true, true at all times, then we are as
pOY/erless to Influence the future as the above counterexample shov'/s
that Y/e are to Influence the past. Thus (G2) I s false, and this f i r s t
c r i t i c i s m of Hackle's argument stands.
5-

Thus our original definition of omnipotence, which w a s given by

(G2)

X I s omnipotent if and only If x can bring about all logically
possible s t a t e s of affairs,

needs to be modified to
(G2')

X i s omnipotent if and only If x can bring about all logically
possible s t a t e s of a f f a i r s p such that "x brings It about that p" i s
logically possible

because there are some s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , those In the past, which It I s
not logically possible for God to now change (and so not something that
He can nov-/ bring about), even though it I s logically possible that they
were different. T h i s i s a consequence of God's being "in time".
it turns out that the original definition of omniscience, that
(G3)

X i s omniscient if and only if x knows all true propositions,

needs to be modified In just the same way, to obtain
(G3')

X I s omniscient If and only if x knows all true propositions p
such that "X knovys that p" i s logically possible.

T h i s i s a consequence of God's being a conscious entity. Kretzmann In
Kretzmann[66l presents the folloY-zing conterexample to (G3): Consider
the two statements:
(1)

Cathy knows that she i s In hospital.

(2)

Cathy knows that Cathy I s in hospital.

The tv-/o are perfectly coherent and furthermore logically Independent.

For If Cathy has amnesia but recognises that she is In a hospital, then
( 0 is true and (2) false, and If Cathy has anrmesia and reads in the paper
that someone called Cathy is in hospital, but does not recognise that
she Is In a hospital then, (2) Is true, and (1) false. Thus what Is krmin
by Cathy In (1) (that she Is in hospital) differs from what she knovv's In
(2) (that Cdihy Is in hospital). But what Cathy knows in ( 0 can only be
knoY/n by Cathy, and no other person, including God. Only Cathy knows
(and could knov/) Yv'hat it is to like her, what is it for her\si be in
hospital. Thus it is possible that there be a true proposition that God
does not (and cannot) know. 'The kind of knowledge [(1)] ascribes to
[Cathy] Is, moreover, the kind of knowledge characteristic of every
self-conscious entity, of every person" (Kretzmann[66],p421). If God's
omniscience is to be possible, then (G3) is false. That it is not JogicdUy
possible that God knows what Cathy knows In (1) suggests that the
modification v/e require is (G3') above. Thus God's Inability to know
something that it is logically impossible for Him to know is not to
count against his omniscience.
6-

There Is, however, some reason to doubt this. For as Bennett
points out:
There ore different ways In which things con be such that people
refrain from doing certain sorts of acts, and not just any way
Involves a loss of free-vv'111. (Bennett[73],p48)

Suppose It actually turns out that all vyrongdoers possess a certain
chromosome - the dreaded R-chromosome - vt'hich partially explains
their wrongdoing. That Is to say that all wrong-doers necessarily have
the chromosome, but there are possessors of the chromosome who,
thanks to strong moral fibre, never sin. The R-chromosome, though
being causally necessary for wrongdoing. Is not causally sufficient for
such behaviour. Next, suppose that the only behaviour that God engages
in, after creating the world at year dot and letting evolution run Its
path. Is to causally determine that fetuses with the R-chromosome are
spontaneously aborted. (This does not entail miraculous Intervention,
for It might just be another type of spontaneous abortion which occurs
due to abnormalities In the fetus. Possession of the R-chromosorne
could count as another type of "abnormality".) In such a v^orld God has
strongly brought it about that (there are free persons and they always
do Vv'hat is right) even though, due to the limited purview of His actions,
there is no free person upon yyhose w i l l God has infringed. All acts are
thus free, and so this situation is one consistent vyith the truth of (F1),

but In Yv'hich (4'ar) is true, it Is plarnnly noi true that the only v-zay for
God to strongly bring it about that there are free persons and that they
alY/ays do what Is right Is to create some free beings and strongly bring
it about that they do only Vv'hat Is right.
One might not be too Impressed with this argument of Bennett's.
For, one could say. If the possession of the R-chromosome Is causally
necessary for wrongdoing, then the absence of the R-chrornosome Is
causally sufficient for good behaviour, and so the people V'/ho did
manage to make It Into the world are not. In fact, free, as their good
behaviour Is causally determined by this absence. There Is, then, some
doubt about (Fl)'s Implying the falsity of (4'a1).
7.

Needless to soy, if Plontlngo is correct In denying (2"), our
modified account of God's omniscience

(G2')

Is omnipotent If and only if x can bring about all logically
possible states of affairs p such that "x brings It about that p" Is
logically possible (see Note 5)

needs to be modified further Plantlnga himself makes no attempt to
Indicate v-zhat this further modification might be, but perhaps it would
be along the following lines. The basic Idea behind Plantinga's denial of
(2") 1s that God's s'^'edk capabilities vary from world to vyorld.
Presumably, hov/ever. His strong capabilities do not (there seems to be
no reason why they should). Thus
(G2") X is omnipotent only If x can strongly bring about all logically
possible state of affairs p such that "x strongly brings it about
that p" is logically possible.
(G2") does not provide o sufficient
for x's being omnipotent,
for there could be beings vyhich, essentially, could strongly do only one
thing, A. If the above condition were sufficient, and there were such
beings, and they could do A, then they would be omnipotent, for it would
be logically impossible that they have any further (strong) powers.
However, it is not plausible to suggest that beings Vv'ith such a small
repertoire of strong behaviour be omnipotent.
The primary reference employed is Lewis[73]. There are a few
comments that need to be made about Lewis's theory. First, there
is much dispute as to the coherence and usefulness of the relation of

8,

compsrltlve si mil on ty between possible worlds. Lewis provides
precise criteria that this relation must satisfy (see pp48-50). 'We
mention the existence of these conditions in order to indicate that any
notion satisfying these requirements would be adequate, and to leave
open the question of v/hether there is any such relation.
The more important point, however, is Lewis's claim that
subjunctives are not any strict conditional: Every strict conditional
"Necessarily, If p then q" implies "Necessarily, if p and r then q" for any
proposition r. But It is possible that the follov'/ing be true together:
(1)
(2)

If Otto had come, It would have been a lively party; but
If both Otto and Anna had come, it would have been a dreary
party.

Hence, the statement "if p were true, then q would be true" Is not
equivalent to any statement of the form "Necessarily, if p then q" and so
not equivalent to the strict conditional "p Is causally sufficient for q".
'We will examine arguments in sections IV and V which seem to be based
on the conflation of these different locutions.
9.

'While the move from •(61^ -> GC) and 6C •-> W to 61^ •-> W is

valid, the situation Is a little more subtle than It appears, for in
general, the Inference
q •-> r
•(p -> q)
p •-> r
Is Invalid for subjunctives. (Suppose, borrowing from Lewis, that Otto
Is V/aldo's successful rival for Anna's affections. Waldo still tags
around after Anna, but never njns the risk of meeting Otto. Otto, for his
own part, intensely dislikes parties (he hates having to make
srnall-talk) so that his having been to a recent party Is not only false,
but decidedly far-fetched. Anna, however, almost did go. it follows that
if Arma had gone, then Waldo would have also, for Otto would still not
have gone (his dislike of parties exceeds his love for Anna, the cad!),
and Waldo, knowing this, Vi'ould have felt secure that he would not meet
Otto, and so Vv'ould have gone. Also, Oito'e and Anna's going to the party
implies Anna's going But if Otto had gone (an unlikely event., to tie

sure), iheif Wsido woiz/if r/otfy&yaJht inference Is thus invalid). Whot is
valid, however, is the inference
•(r -> q)
q •-> r
•(p -> q)
p •-> r
Where r is a possible v/orld VV, which includes a possible state of
affairs q, then DiV-/ -> q) is true, and so the inference
oq
q • - > V^
•(p -> q)
p •-> W

Is valid. More generally, while
pn->q
q •-> r
p •-> r
is not valid (Lewis calls it the fallacy of transitivity), the following
inference is:
q 0-> p
pD->q
q
r
p •-> r

10.

But is (9) logically possible? Plantinga offers no argument but
thinks that it^is "clearly consistent". Perhaps v^'e can offer the
following. Suppose that
(1)

(a) God exists, (b) that anyone that V'/ould be created v-zould
suffer from transv/orld depravity, (c) that every Vv'orld Y/ith free

creatures who Qlrnost always do what is right is better than (c1)
any v/orld v/ith no free agents, and (c2) any v/orld with free
agents v^ho do not almost alvv'ays do v^hat is right, and (d) that
there is a v-zorld 'W in which all free perons almost alv-zays do
vyhat is right.
Then God, if He is all-good, would create a world at least as good as W.
Such a world, however, would have free creatures, so that it follov^s
from (1) that
(2)

God creates a world with free creatures.

As (1) is logically possible and entails (2), then it is logically possible
that God exist. He create free persons, and that they all suffer from
transworld depravity. (1), above, seems more clearly consistent than
(11.9).
11.

This is not the only criticism of Plentinga's notion of "weak
actualisation". Chemoff, for example, claims that
Plantinga's argument encounters ... serious problems, due to the
use of counterfactuals that emply the terms "actualization" and
"world", like . . . If God had actualized C, Vv'orld W vv'ould be
actual. (Chernoff[80],p269)

The charge is made that
(the possible world analysis] analyses "If God had actualized
world W . . . " as "In the closest v/orld to the actual v/orld in
Y/hich God actualizes V^ . . .". This is either a flat contradiction
or sheer nonsense. (Chernoff(80],p269)
The core of Chernoff's complaint seems to be that Plantinga's possible
world analysis of "weak actualisation" is nonsense when applied to
possible worlds themselves. In reply, we attempt to provide two
understandings of the locution "God can weakly actualise a possible
world Vf.
The first, from Burch[79j, Is based on the Lewis understanding of
counterfactuals. God can vyeakly actualises Vi' if andf only If there is
some state of affairs C that God can strongly actualise such that GC
U-y V'/. But GC • - > 'W if and only if either GC is impossible or there is a

possible world V-/* In V'/hich GC and W obtain V'/hich Is closer (to the
actual V'/orld) than any world In -which GC and not-V/ obtain. But If
possible world V^ obtains In V^*, then the two are the same, and so GC
•-> V'/ If and only If GC Is Impossible or GC holds in 'W and Vy is closer
(to the actual v/orld) than any GC-v/orld (that is, a v/orld in which GC
obtains). Thus GC •-> Vî' if and only if GC is impossible or
is the
closest GC-y/orld (to the actual world). But for God's strong
capabilities, vv'hat is logicôJJy possible for God to do coincides vt'ith
what God can do (see (G2") in P^ote 7). That is, God can strongly
actualise C if and only if GC is logically possible. Hence
(1)

God can weakly actualise W if and only if there is some state of
affairs C for which W Is the closest GC-world (to the actual
YîTorld).

The relation of closeness (based on comparltlve similarity)
bet'ween possible 'worlds is the subject of much dispute and so 'we
provide a second understanding of the locution "God can 'weakly
actualise possible world W. Again, this last is true if and only If there
is some state of affairs C that God can strongly actualise such that GC
•-> W. But, to say that V^ obtains is to say that every state of affairs p
in
obtains. Hence GC •-> W is equivalent to GC •-> (for all p in W, p
is true) 'Which in turn is equ1valent(?) to (for all p In W, GC •-> p). Thus
(2)

God can 'weakly actualise W if and only if there Is some state of
affairs C that God can strongly actualise such that for all states
of affairs p in Vt', GC •-> p.

This is equivalent to
(3)

God con weakly actualise W if and only If there Is some set S of
states of affairs, that God can strongly actualise together, such
that for all states of affairs p in 'W there is a Cp In S such that
GCp •-> p.

The state of affairs C in (2) is the conjunction of the states of affairs
of S in (3). Chernoff's complaint was that a locution such as "God can
weakly actualise W is meaningless because It involves counterfactuals
•which refer to ('whole) possible v/orlds. The analysis provided by (3)
shov'/s that this is not in fact a problem because such locutions are
equivalent to statements involving counterfactuals as Innocuous as "if
God 'were to new set off the alarm (Cp), then Anna 'would a'wake and have

cornflakes for breakfest (p)". Chernoff's complaint is unfounded.
12.

Burch gives a particularly succinct proof of this statement by
employing (1) of Note 11. He firstly shoY/s that

(1)

If God can actualise 'W, then GT,^ • - > W.

For suppose that there is some state of affairs C such that 6C is
possible and 6C • - >
The V-/ is the nearest possible world containing
6C. Hence
contains 6C. (GC is possible by hypothesis. Hence by
definition, T^ includes C, and so GT^ includes GC.) Hence V^ is the
nearest possible world containing GT.^. (If not, then there is a closer
possible world V/* containing GT^ and so also GC - v^hich is not
possible.) Hence GT.^ • - > W. It is then shovyn that
(2)

If GC is possible and GC • - >

and GC • - > W * then W = Vt'*.

As GC Is possible V^ is the closest possible Vv'orld containing GC. As is
W*. Hence W = W*. But from this it follov/s that
(3)

If God can actualise both W and vy*, then T ^ = T^* if and only if
W = W*.

For suppose that T ^ = T^^, then as God can actualise W and W*, we get
GT\f • - > Vi^ and GT^^
• - > W*, and so GT^ • - > V^*. Hence W = W*. The
W
converse is trivial.
13.

For if the "depends" in (9') Is to be understood In such a way as
to make (12) true, then It appears to be a more particular
version of the claim that
(9")

If it is not possible that p be tnje and that x do A, and p is true
(and so x doesn't do A), then p's truth depends on x's not doing A.

However, the conjunction of (9") and (12) entails that explanations of
action do not Imply the act in question. This view is at odds with
various accounts of explanation, v/here to explain q Is to produce some
suitable p^ to p^, which jointly entail q. Thus to explain why x murdered
3 dozen people one might say that x had the R chromosome, and that all
people Y'/ith this chromosome are (or will become) mass-murderers.

This Issue of explanation Is a complex one, but these considerations
seem to cast some doubt upon a crucial premise, (9), of Adams's
argument.
Hovvever, this is not the end of the matter Theists claim that
God didn't refrain from creating free beings because. In part, (8) vyas
true. But what follovvs from
(10')

(18) Implies that God did not refrain from creating free beings

Is in fact much stronger than this, namely that He didn't refrain from
creating free beings orilybecduse (8) v/as true. This no thelst vyants to
accept, for it would be Inconsistent v/ith their more detailed claim that
He didn't refrain from creating free beings because (8) was true m d
tecduse He is all-good end so desires the best for all his creatures, if
(8)'s being true Implies God's not refraining from creating free beings,
then it would the total explanation of God's doing this. Thus, pdce
Adams, it wcajJd be an explanation, but one that no thelst could accept,
for it allOY'/s no room for God's goodness as part of the explanation. The
argument is thus:
(10')

(8) implies that God does not refrain from creating free beings.

(11)

(8)'s truth partially explains why God did not refrain from
creating free beings
If p partially explains q ,and p Implies q, then p totally explains
q. Thus
(8)'s truth totally explains why God did not refrain from
creating free beings.

(12)
(13)

The thelst has a problem, as (10') and (12) seem to be true, and (11) and
the negation of (13) are part of the theist's doctrine.
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